A General Class of Adaptative Strategies.
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Description: Paper by Mas-Colell et al. characterizes simple adaptive strategies, in the repeated play of a game, having the Hannan-consistency property.
EconPapers: A general class of adaptative strategies A general class of adaptative strategies We exhibit and characterize an entire class of simple adaptive strategies, in the repeated play of a game, having the Hannan-consistency property: In the long-run, the player is guaranteed an average payoff as large as the best-reply payoff to the empirical distribution of play of the other players; i.e., there is no "regret." Smooth fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine [1995]) and regret-matching (Hart and Mas-Colell [1998]) are particular cases. The motivation and application of this work come from the study of procedures whose empirical distribution of play is, in the long-run, (almost) a correlated equilibrium. The basic tool for the analysis is a generalization of Blackwell's [1956a] approachability strategy for games with vector payoffs.
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| Page title: | EconPapers: A general class of adaptative strategies |
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| Description: | By Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell; Abstract: We exhibit and characterize an entire class of simple adaptive strategies, in the repeated play of a game, having the |
| IP-address: | 130.243.97.83 |