Semantic Challenges to Realism
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Description: Realism and the representation problem; by Drew Khlentzos.
Challenges to Metaphysical Realism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Challenges to Metaphysical Realism First published Thu Jan 11, 2001; substantive revision Tue Feb 1, 2011 According to metaphysical realism, the world is as it is independently of how humans take it to be. The objects the world contains, together with their properties and the relations they enter into, fix the world's nature and these objects exist independently of our ability to discover they do. Unless this is so, metaphysical realists argue, none of our beliefs about our world could be objectively true since true beliefs tell us how things are and beliefs are objective when true or false independently of what anyone might think.
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