Moral Particularism
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Description: The claim that there are no defensible moral principles; by Jonathan Dancy.
Moral Particularism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) First published Wed Jun 6, 2001; substantive revision Thu Aug 15, 2013 Moral Particularism, at its most trenchant, is the claim that there are no defensible moral principles, that moral thought does not consist in the application of moral principles to cases, and that the morally perfect person should not be conceived as the person of principle. There are more cautious versions, however. The strongest defensible version, perhaps, holds that though there may be some moral principles, still the rationality of moral thought and judgement in no way depends on a suitable provision of such things; and the perfectly moral judge would need far more than a grasp on an appropriate range of principles and the ability to apply them. Moral principles are at best crutches that a morally sensitive person would not require, and indeed the use of such crutches might even lead us into moral error.
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